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Outsourcing Criminal Prosecution?:  
The Limits of Criminal Justice Privatization 
Roger A. Fairfax, Jr.† 
ABSTRACT 
In an era of scarce public resources, many jurisdictions are 
being forced to take drastic measures to address severe budgetary 
constraints on the administration of criminal justice. As prosecu-
tors’ budgets around the nation are being scaled back and en-
forcement capacities are being narrowed, one conceivable response 
is the outsourcing of the criminal prosecution function to private 
lawyers. Indeed, prosecution outsourcing currently is utilized in 
surprising measure by jurisdictions in the United States. This 
Article, prepared for the University of Chicago Legal Forum  
Symposium on Crime, Criminal Law, and the Recession, argues 
that the outsourcing trend in criminal justice—seen most promi-
nently in the area of private prisons and policing—should not 
extend to criminal prosecution because such outsourcing is in ten-
sion with the constitutional and positive law norms regulating the 
public-private distinction. Furthermore, concerns about ethics, 
fairness, transparency, accountability, performance, and the im-
portant values advanced by the public prosecution norm all mili-
tate against the outsourcing of the criminal prosecution function 
to private lawyers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The private role in criminal justice has grown considerably 
over the past three decades, particularly in corrections and polic-
ing. The most common form of privatization in this arena has 
been outsourcing, an arrangement in which the government con-
tracts with a private entity to render goods or services previously 
provided by the government. Advocates of outsourcing cite effi-
ciency, enhanced service, and cost savings as rationales for the 
private performance of these criminal justice functions. 
Many of these same perceived benefits presumably could be 
derived from the outsourcing of the prosecutorial function to pri-
vate lawyers—a particularly tempting solution in an era of di-
minished public resources prompted by the current economic cri-
sis. In fact, the prosecutorial function already is being outsourced 
to private lawyers in smaller jurisdictions across the United 
States. This phenomenon is poised to expand as larger jurisdic-
tions are forced to slash already tight law enforcement budgets. 
This Article argues that such prosecution outsourcing is in ten-
sion with the constitutional and positive law norms governing 
outsourcing and privatization. 
Part I of the Article examines the growing trend of privatiza-
tion and outsourcing in the criminal justice system through the 
prism of private prisons and private policing. Part II provides the 
contours of what is the central focus of the Article’s critique and 
analysis—the outsourcing of the criminal prosecution function. 
Part II sets out two thought experiments to serve as a point of 
departure for the subsequent discussion of the nature, extent, 
and future prospects of government delegation of criminal prose-
cution to private actors. 
Part III then argues that prosecution outsourcing is in ten-
sion with norms regulating the public-private distinction, includ-
ing those gleaned both from constitutional constraints on the 
delegation of governmental functions to private actors, and from 
the positive law of government outsourcing. Part III also raises a 
number of ethical, performance, and accountability concerns with 
the government practice of contracting with private attorneys to 
prosecute criminal cases. 
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I. CRIMINAL JUSTICE PRIVATIZATION 
Government engages in a substantial amount of privatiza-
tion.1 “Privatization is a word with many different meanings,”2 
but it typically is used to characterize the phenomenon in which 
government delegates to the private sector functions formerly 
performed by the state and deemed to be public.3 The state pri-
vatizes functions for a variety of reasons, ranging from entity 
diversity and interest representation to expertise, cost savings, 
and efficiency.4 Of the various species of privatization engaged in 
by American governmental entities,5 the most common type of 
  
 1 See Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 Fla St U L Rev 155, 155 (2000) (“In 
the United States, federal, state, and local governments now routinely employ contracts 
with private providers to furnish services, deliver benefits, and perform significant (and 
sometimes traditionally ‘public’) functions.”); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as 
Delegation, 103 Colum L Rev 1367, 1369 (2003) (“Recent privatization efforts, particularly 
in health care and welfare programs, public education, and prisons, reveal a trend of 
greater discretion and broader responsibilities being delegated to private hands.”); Scott 
Shane and Ron Nixon, In Washington, Contractors Take On Biggest Role Ever, NY Times 
A11 (Feb 4, 2007); Jeff McDonald, City Looks at County’s Outsourcing as Blueprint, SD 
Union-Trib A1 (July 23, 2006). 
  This privatization trend, which, as Professor Freeman notes, has been developing 
over the past half-century, is unlikely to cease in the near future. See Freeman, 28 Fla St 
U L Rev at 161–62 (cited in note 1). See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Book Review, 
Outsourcing Is Not Our Only Problem, 76 Geo Wash L Rev 1216, 1227 (2008). However, 
recent political changes may lead to the eventual scaling back of federal reliance on con-
tractors. See The White House, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments 
and Agencies Re Government Contracting, 74 Fed Reg 9755 (Mar 4, 2009); Daniel 
Zwerdling, Obama to Tackle Explosion in Federal Contracts, National Public Radio Morn-
ing Edition (Dec 1, 2008). See also Daniel Zwerdling, New President Faces Powerful 
Federal Contractors, National Public Radio Morning Edition (Dec 2, 2008). 
 2 Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1377 (cited in note 1). See also Allison Stanger, One 
Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign 
Policy (Yale 2009). 
 3 See Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1377 (cited in note 1) (observing that the term 
“privatization” “is conventionally understood to signify a transfer of public responsibilities 
to private hands”); Ellen Dannin, To Market, To Market: Legislating on Privatization and 
Subcontracting, 60 Md L Rev 249, 258 (2001) (describing privatization as “a blanket term 
that includes different forms of shifting from publicly to privately produced goods and 
services”); David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 Ind L J 647, 
647 (1985) (defining privatization as “turning formerly governmental responsibilities over 
to the private sector”); Laurin A. Wollan, Jr., The Privatization of Criminal Justice, in 
Proceedings of the 29th Annual Southern Conference on Corrections 111 (Florida State 
1984) (defining privatization as the “non-governmental performance of a function”). 
 4 See Pierce, 76 Geo Wash L Rev at 1227 (cited in note 1) (“The number of govern-
ment functions that can only be performed effectively by highly skilled people is steadily 
increasing. The market for such highly skilled people has changed to the point at which 
the salaries they can command in the private market vastly exceed the maximum salary 
the government can pay.”); Lawrence, 61 Ind L J at 651–57 (cited in note 3) (suggesting 
that pluralism, interest representation, flexibility of private entities, expertise, and cost 
are all justifications). 
 5 See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms through Privatization, 116 Harv 
L Rev 1285, 1287 (2003). 
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privatization is outsourcing—the “contracting out with a private 
firm for the production of some good or service that was  
previously exclusively produced by a public-sector agency or  
bureaucracy.”6 
Importantly, under the “outsourcing” or “contracting-out” 
model of privatization, the government does not cede the funda-
mental duty or responsibility for the performance of the function. 
The government maintains the duty to ensure the function is 
performed, but simply contracts with a private actor to perform 
it.7 As criminal justice privatization proponent Bruce Benson 
notes, under a “contracting-out” regime “[t]he determination of 
what is going to be demanded from and produced by the firm  
under contract remains in the political arena, under the influ-
ence of interest groups and public officials rather than under the 
  
 6 Bruce L. Benson, To Serve and Protect: Privatization and Community in Criminal 
Justice 15 (NYU 1998); see also Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1378, 1378 n 17 (cited in 
note 1); Freeman, 116 Harv L Rev at 1287 (cited in note 5). 
  A significant amount of recent scholarly commentary has focused on contemporary 
and historical American privatization in the military and foreign policy arena. See gener-
ally Stanger, One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the 
Future of Foreign Policy (cited in note 2); Benedict Sheehy, Jackson Maogoto, and 
Virginia Newell, Legal Control of the Private Military Corporation (Palgrave Macmillan 
2009); Simon Chesterman, From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of 
Private Military Companies (Oxford 2007); Steven L. Schooner and Daniel S. 
Greenspahn, Too Dependent on Contractors? Minimum Standards for Responsible Gov-
ernance, J Cont Mgmt 209 (Summer 2008). See also Theodore M. Cooperstein, Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal: The Constitutional Law and Practice of Privateering, 40 J Marit L 
& Comm 221 (2009); William Young, A Check on Faint-Hearted Presidents: Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal, 66 Wash & Lee L Rev 895 (2009). 
  For a broad introduction to the topic of privatization from various perspectives, see 
generally Simon Chesterman and Angelina Fisher, eds, Private Security, Public Order: 
The Outsourcing of Public Services and Its Limits (Oxford 2009); Jody Freeman and 
Martha Minow, eds, Government by Contract: Outsourcing and American Democracy 
(Harvard 2009); Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty: Why Privatization of 
Government Functions Threatens Democracy and What We Can Do about It (Cambridge 
2007); Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals: Privatization and the Public Good (Beacon 
2002); Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1371 (cited in note 1); Jody Freeman, The Private 
Role in Public Governance, 75 NYU L Rev 543, 595 (2000). 
 7 This can be contrasted with the other major model of privatization, in which the 
government “remov[es] certain responsibilities, activities, or assets from the collective 
realm.” Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1378 (cited in note 1), quoting John D. Donahue, 
The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means 215 (Basic 1989) (“[T]wo concepts 
share the same word—privatization. The first concept . . . involves removing certain re-
sponsibilities, activities or assets from the collective realm. . . . [T]he second . . . [involves] 
retaining collective financing but delegating delivery to the private sector.”). See also 
Stan Soloway and Alan Chvotkin, Federal Contracting in Context, in Freeman and  
Minow, eds, Government by Contract 195–97 (cited in note 6). 
  A common example of this type of public-private partnership can be found in the 
many road, bridge, or tunnel construction public works projects that are privately fi-
nanced in exchange for the private entity’s right to extract tolls to recoup costs and turn a 
profit. 
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direct control of private citizens acting as individual buyers.”8 
Benson terms this approach “partial privatization.”9 In contrast, 
“complete privatization” entails “private-sector control over all of 
the decisions regarding the use of resources devoted to the pro-
tection of persons and property.”10 
Although some have theorized that government could en-
gage in complete privatization in the criminal justice arena,11 
most criminal justice outsourcing can be characterized as “par-
tial” privatization. For example, government might privatize cer-
tain aspects of the provision of a service (for example, a prison 
contracting out the preparation of meals for inmates) or even the 
entire provision of a service (for example, contracting with a pri-
vate corporation to operate a prison),12 but would not simply 
withdraw from the duty of providing corrections and leave it to 
the private market to determine whether and how individuals 
will be incarcerated. As Professor Metzger explains: 
[P]rivatization is poorly characterized as government 
withdrawal or disinvolvement from an area of activity. . . . 
In many instances of privatization, the overall context 
remains one of significant government endeavor; . . . the 
government provides the funds, sets programmatic goals 
and requirements, or enacts the regulatory scheme into 
which private decisionmaking is incorporated. But the 
government relies on private actors for actual implemen-
tation. Rather than government withdrawal, the result is 
a system of public-private collaboration, a “regime of 
‘mixed administration’” in which both public and private 
actors share responsibilities.13 
While acknowledging the rich complexity attending the concept 
of government outsourcing, this Article uses the terms “out-
sourcing,” “contracting out,” and “privatization” in the spirit of 
  
 8 Benson, To Serve and Protect at 15 (cited in note 6). 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. See also Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1370 (cited in note 1). 
 11 Criminal justice scholar Laurin Wollan describes this as the “‘step back and let it 
go’ strategy,” which entails “going beyond mere substitution of private for public perfor-
mance under contractual or other constraints.” Wollan, The Privatization of Criminal 
Justice at 124 (cited in note 3). Wollan ponders whether criminal justice privatization can 
expand to full and complete privatization by “boldly going to the point—and without 
provision for such controlled substitutions—of simply letting the function be, to see if it 
gets performed at all.” Id. 
 12 See Part I.A.1. 
 13 Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1394–95 (cited in note 1) (internal citations omitted). 
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Benson’s “partial” privatization definition. Under this concep-
tion, the government entity never cedes the prerogative of direct-
ing the efforts of the private actor and never disowns the funda-
mental duty to ensure the function is performed (by whoever is 
tasked with performing it) in the first place.14 
The private role in criminal justice administration has be-
come more pronounced in recent years.15 From crime prevention 
and detection to adjudication and corrections, private actors per-
form functions many would assume were exclusively public.16 
  
 14 The use of the word “function” here carries significance. Another important dichot-
omy in the outsourcing literature is the privatization of governmental powers versus the 
privatization of governmental functions. See generally Lawrence, 61 Ind L J 647 (cited in 
note 3) (distinguishing between privatization of government functions and privatization 
of governmental powers, and concluding that the latter is more problematic). The con-
tracting out of tax collection to a private collection agency would be an example of privati-
zation of a governmental function. Granting a private entity the ability to freeze a tax-
payer’s assets for nonpayment of taxes might be considered an example of the privatiza-
tion of a governmental power. Also, it is important to note that when outsourcing gov-
ernmental functions to private actors, governments can retain control while outsourcing 
the execution. See, for example, Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 
2005 Utah L Rev 573, 586 (“[A] public agency retains oversight over the prison, even 
though day-to-day management may be left to the privately contracted company.”). Alter-
natively, a government could cede to a private entity all control and authority over the 
provision of a function. Related to this concept is the division between those functions 
which are ministerial in nature and those which require the exercise of discretion by 
those performing the function. See Part III.B. 
 15 See generally Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 Wake Forest L Rev 911 
(2007). 
 16 See Stanger, One Nation under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and 
the Future of Foreign Policy 26 (cited in note 2) (“Running a prison or policing the streets 
seems like an inherently governmental function—an essential part of ‘preventing coer-
cion’ or ‘protecting citizens’—yet both prisons and policing have been privatized.”); Ben-
son, To Serve and Protect 17 (cited in note 6) (“[M]any components of the public sector’s 
criminal justice system are actually being produced by employees of private firms.”). See 
also Charles H. Logan, Private Prisons: Cons and Pros 58–59 (Oxford 1990); Wollan, The 
Privatization of Criminal Justice at 113–23 (cited in note 3). Professor Wollan makes the 
point that although most would reflexively resist the notion that criminal justice might be 
conducted by private actors, once the various criminal justice functions are dissected, the 
private role is more easily acknowledged (or imagined). See id at 113–14. For instance, 
although pre-trial supervision and detention would appear to be an exclusively public 
function, the bail bondsman is a stark example of the state ceding to private actors a 
public criminal justice function. A private bail bondsman provides to the court the total 
amount of a defendant’s bail in exchange for a nonrefundable fee (typically 10 percent of 
the bail amount) from the defendant and perhaps some form of collateral to ensure the 
defendant’s appearance and the bondsman’s recovery of the bail money. The risk of finan-
cial loss gives the bondsman an incentive to track down and bring to court bailed defend-
ants who have absconded. For a description of the private bail bondsman’s role, see, for 
example, Stephen A. Saltzburg and Daniel J. Capra, American Criminal Procedure 936–
40 (Thomson 8th ed 2007). Without this private role, the alternative might be widespread 
incidence of defendants without financial resources having to remain in jail prior to trial, 
see id at 937, or even a move to universal pre-trial detention, an option that would be 
both cost-prohibitive and unwise from a public policy and penological standpoint. 
  Also, part-time judges—private lawyers hired to hear cases in public courts on a 
part-time or fee basis—are utilized in many jurisdictions. See, for example, Tenn Code 
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The expanding private role in criminal justice is most notable 
and visible in the areas of private prisons and private policing. 
A. Outsourcing Corrections—Private Prisons 
Private prisons are a prominent example of outsourcing in 
criminal justice at both the federal and state levels.17 Despite the 
decidedly public nature of modern corrections,18 governments 
have engaged in the contracting of prison administration services 
for juvenile offenders since the 1800s.19 In response to the explo-
sion in prison population prompted by the drug enforcement poli-
cies of the 1980s and 1990s, governments began to rely more 
heavily upon the private sector for the provision of corrections 
services for adults.20 As a result, a significant number of state 
and federal prisoners are now in the custody of private entities.21 
Prison outsourcing can range from the private provision of 
certain services, such as inmate medical care and feeding, to the 
full private operation of a correctional facility.22 In all of these 
roles, private prison contractors might exercise tremendous dis-
  
§ 7-3-311(g)(2003); State of Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline, Opinion JE04-03 
(Mar 17, 2004), online at http://judicial.state.nv.us/je040033new.htm (visited Sept 7, 
2010); J. Anthony McLain, Part-Time Judges, Part-Time Assistant District Attorneys and 
Imputed Disqualification, 70 Ala Law 217 (2009). However, the practice has come under 
fire on the grounds that it presents the perception—if not the reality—of conflict of inter-
est, and undermines the rule of law. See, for example, Sarah Foster, Ohio Considers 
Eliminating Part-Time Judges, Miami Student (Sept 26, 2006), online at http://www. 
miamistudent.net/2.8197/ohio-considers-eliminating-part-time-judges-1.1153773 (visited 
Sept 7, 2010); James L. Cotton, Jr., The Impossible Balance: A Tennessee Judge Makes the 
Case for Abolishing State’s Part-Time Judgeships, 37 Tenn Bar J 12, 15 (May 2001). 
 17 As Professor Jody Freeman observes, the history of public corrections and its pro-
vision of prison labor to the private sector “complicates the common view of incarceration 
as a traditionally public enterprise.” Freeman, 75 NYU L Rev at 626 (cited in note 6). See 
also Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1392 (cited in note 1); Freeman, 28 Fla St U L Rev at 
162, 185–86 (cited in note 1). 
 18 See, for example, Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1499 (cited in note 1) (“Notwith-
standing the lengthy historical pedigree of private involvement in incarceration, today 
punishment and the legitimate use of physical coercion are seen as exclusive state pre-
rogatives.”). 
 19 See Logan, Private Prisons 9, 15 (cited in note 16). Although the operation of se-
cure correctional facilities has not been privatized widely on the federal level, the federal 
Bureau of Prisons has outsourced its community-based halfway house operations for the 
past thirty years. See Benson, To Serve and Protect at 21 (cited in note 6); Logan, Private 
Prisons at 16 (cited in note 16). 
 20 See Logan, Private Prisons at 9–10, 20 (cited in note 16). Sharon Dolovich, State 
Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 Duke L J 437, 439–40 (2005). 
 21 Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1393 (cited in note 1) (“In 2001, 12.3% of all federal 
prisoners and 5.8% of all state prisoners, approximately 92,000 inmates, were housed in 
private prison facilities.”). 
 22 See Freeman, 28 Fla St U L Rev at 185–87 (cited in note 1); see also Minow, 
Partners, Not Rivals at 20 (cited in note 6). 
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cretion.23 Also, because private prison contractors act as agents 
of the state, misconduct by private prison officials may be action-
able, in certain circumstances, against the outsourcing govern-
ment entity under constitutional tort principles.24 
The literature on private prisons is rich and wide-ranging.25 
Some commentators reject the premise that private prisons are 
practically viable or bristle at the notion that private actors are 
entrusted with the sovereign duty to punish.26 Others perceive 
the heightened potential for corruption and human rights abuses 
in private prisons.27 However, many trumpet private prisons as a 
way to deliver higher-quality, safer corrections at a fraction of 
the cost of public corrections.28 Although there are many issues 
generated by the debate over whether a private firm should pro-
vide public correctional services,29 “[f]ew deny that private pris-
  
 23 See Freeman, 28 Fla St U L Rev at 188 (cited in note 1). 
 24 See Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty at 38 (cited in note 6). 
 25 For insightful commentary on the myriad considerations highlighted in the debate 
surrounding the private provision of corrections services, see Logan, Private Prisons at 
38–48 (cited in note 16). See also generally Gary W. Bowman et al, eds, Privatizing Cor-
rectional Institutions (Transaction 1993); Douglas C. McDonald, ed, Private Prisons and 
the Public Interest (Rutgers 1990); Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and 
Economics of Political Advocacy, 60 Stan L Rev 1197 (2008); Dolovich, 55 Duke L J 437 
(cited in note 20); Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 40 
Vand L Rev 813 (1987); Richard Culp, Prison Privatization Turns Twenty-Five: The 
Evolution of a Mature Private Prison Industry in the United States, July 2009, online at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1462792 (visited July 4, 2010). 
 26 See, for example, John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Duty to Govern: A Critical Perspective on 
the Private Management of Prisons and Jails, in McDonald, ed, Private Prisons and the 
Public Interest 155–78 (cited in note 25); Freeman, 75 NYU L Rev at 631 (cited in note 6). 
See also Freeman, 28 Fla St U L Rev at 187 (cited in note 1) (“Those who object to prison 
privatization reject it on moral as well as pragmatic grounds.”). 
 27 See, for example, Elaine R. Jones, Private Prisons Profiting at the Expense of 
Women of Color, The New Crisis, Mar/Apr 2001, online at http://findarticles.com/ 
p/articles/mi_qa3812/is_200103/ai_n8932486/?tag=content;coll (visited July 4, 2010); Lisa 
Belkin, Rise of Private Prisons: How Much of a Bargain?, NY Times A14 (Mar 27, 1989). 
A recent high-profile example of corruption related to the private prison industry can be 
found in the case of Pennsylvania judges sentencing juveniles to private prisons in ex-
change for kickbacks. See Stephanie Chen, Pennsylvania Rocked by ‘Jailing Kids for 
Cash’ Scandal, Cable News Network (Feb 24, 2009), online at http://www.cnn.com/ 
2009/CRIME/02/23/pennsylvania.corrupt.judges/ (visited Mar 17, 2010); Ian Urbina and 
Sean D. Hamill, Judges Plead Guilty in Scheme to Jail Youths for Profit, NY Times A22 
(Feb 13, 2009). 
 28 See, for example, Logan, Private Prisons at 76–118 (cited in note 16). 
 29 Professor Charles Logan provides a useful typology of the central concerns: (1) 
propriety of having correctional services delivered by private actors; (2) whether privati-
zation of corrections results in lower costs; (3) the impact correctional privatization will 
have on the quality of imprisonment; (4) the impact correctional privatization will have 
on quantity of imprisonment; (5) whether private jailers are more flexible and adaptable 
to change than their bureaucratic counterparts; (6) whether private corrections providers 
can ensure security of their facilities; (7) whether private corrections providers will ex-
pose government to greater or lesser tort liability; (8) whether private corrections provid-
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ons are wielding government power, given that the right to  
physically constrain and coerce others is ordinarily reserved for 
the state.”30 
B. Outsourcing Law Enforcement—Private Policing 
Private policing is another prominent example of the private 
exercise of criminal justice functions.31 Public policing took hold 
in the United States in the mid-nineteenth century.32 However, 
over the past several decades, the private presence in policing 
has increased dramatically. As Professor Ric Simmons noted in 
his recent study of increasing privatization in the criminal jus-
tice system, “[t]he degree to which private entities have taken 
over law enforcement functions in this country is extraordi-
nary.”33 Paul Verkuil notes that “the number of private police 
exceeds the number of federal, state, and local ‘public’ police 
combined.”34 
Many private police are retained by private communities 
and business groups to serve as an adjunct to the publicly paid 
and maintained police force. The ubiquity of privatized police in 
American society—in such familiar contexts as stadium security, 
school and university police, and the ever-popular “mall cops”—
  
ers are less accountable to the public; (9) the greater or lesser susceptibility of private 
corrections providers to corruption; and (10) whether privatization of corrections would 
give rise to a dangerous governmental dependence upon the private sector for a crucial 
function. See Logan, Private Prisons at 38–40 (cited in note 16). The various concerns 
cited, as Logan points out, offer insight into the breadth of the “many philosophical, em-
pirical, and policy questions” raised by private prisons. Id at 38. See also Metzger, 103 
Colum L Rev at 1393–94 (cited in note 1). 
 30 Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1397 (cited in note 1). 
 31 For an introduction to the private policing regime, see generally Simmons, 42 
Wake Forest L Rev 911 (cited in note 15); Joh, 2005 Utah L Rev 573 (cited in note 14); 
Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J Crim L & Criminol 49 (2004); 
David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L Rev 1165 (1999). 
 32 See Robert D. McCrie, Three Centuries of Criminal Justice Privatization in the 
United States, in Gary W. Bowman et al, eds, Privatizing the United States Justice Sys-
tem: Police, Adjudication, and Corrections Services from the Private Sector 16–17 (McFar-
land 1992). See also Sklansky, 46 UCLA L Rev at 1205–11 (cited in note 31). 
 33 Simmons, 42 Wake Forest L Rev at 919 (cited in note 15) 
 34 Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty at 38 (cited in note 6). Private police outnumber 
“public” police officers and expenditures on private police service are at least double that 
for public policing. See Simmons, 42 Wake Forest L Rev at 920–22 & nn 34–35 (cited in 
note 15); Joh, 95 J Crim & Criminol at 50 (“Private police long ago outpaced the public 
police in terms of persons employed and dollars spent.”) (cited in note 31); Sklansky, 46 
UCLA L Rev at 1165 (cited in note 31) (“The private security industry already employs 
more guards, patrol personnel, and detectives than the federal, state, and local govern-
ments combined, and the disparity is growing . . . .”); Joseph E. Field, Making Prisons 
Private: An Improper Delegation of a Governmental Power, 15 Hofstra L Rev 649, 663–64 
(1987). 
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has rendered their existence unremarkable to the average 
American.35 The rationale underlying the explosion in the private 
police presence is that public police resources are not sufficient to 
protect the property and personal interests of those segments of 
society able to afford additional security.36 As Professor Elizabeth 
Joh notes, “[m]any of these privately paid police behave like pub-
lic law enforcement officers: detaining individuals, conducting 
searches, investigating crimes, and maintaining order.”37 
Although those apprehended by private police officers may be 
turned over to the public authorities for prosecution,38 most pri-
vate police are not in privity with the state and are not state ac-
tors for purposes of constitutional remedies.39 Therefore, conduct 
that otherwise would give rise to either constitutional reme-
dies—civil or exclusionary—against the government or its actors 
is actionable only against the private police agency or the private 
entity or individual employing such agency. What this means in 
addition to more narrow civil remedies is the possibility that evi-
dence will be collected in a way that offends constitutional 
norms, but that still can be shared with government prosecutors 
for use in establishing criminal liability. 
In addition, there are instances in which the government—
rather than private entities—contracts with private firms to pro-
vide services traditionally performed by the public police.40 As 
Professor Joh notes, “[i]n publicly contracted policing, a private 
police agency replaces a specific service formerly performed by 
the government, rather than simply offering in the private mar-
  
 35 Two recent studio films present a humorous, if irreverent, picture of the work done 
by mall “police” officers. See Manohla Dargis, Mall Crisis? Call Security. Then Again, 
Maybe Not, NY Times C1 (Apr 10, 2009) (review of Warner Brothers film Observe and 
Report); Nathan Lee, A Hapless Security Guard Runs Amok, NY Times C1 (Jan 16, 2009) 
(review of Sony Pictures film Paul Blart: Mall Cop). 
 36 See Wollan, The Privatization of Criminal Justice (cited in note 3). 
 37 Joh, 95 J Crim & Criminol at 50 (cited in 31). 
 38 However, private entities theoretically may sponsor and conduct their own pro-
ceedings against the wrongdoer. See Simmons, 42 Wake Forest L Rev at 962 (cited in 
note 15); see also Ric Simmons, Private Plea Bargains, 89 NC L Rev (forthcoming 2011), 
online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1622846 (visited Sept 7, 2010). 
 39 Id at 979–81. 
 40 The evidence shows that the incidence of government outsourcing of police func-
tions is considerable, though not as pervasive as government outsourcing of prison man-
agement. See Joh, 2005 Utah L Rev at 586 (“[O]nly some private policing is contracted 
out by cost-conscious public agencies. Much private policing arises from the private sector 
to meet private demands.”) (internal citations omitted) (cited in note 14). Government 
entities rank just behind manufacturing and retail firms in terms of the extent of their 
outsourcing functions to private security firms. See Benson, To Serve and Protect at 18 
(cited in note 6). 
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ket services that also happen to be offered by government.”41 In 
this context, private policing actors are in privity with the state. 
Over the past 35 years, government entities have outsourced 
various “subservice” police functions, such as crime laboratory 
analysis, data entry, dispatch, guarding detainees, and trans-
porting prisoners, with increasing frequency.42 Additionally, 
what might be considered “core” police activities also have been 
outsourced.43 For instance, a number of jurisdictions have con-
tracted with private security firms to patrol certain geographic 
areas.44 Other jurisdictions have engaged private firms to con-
duct investigations on behalf of the governmental entity.45 
Furthermore, although the evidence does not show the practice 
to be widespread, there are instances of governments outsourcing 
the entire policing function to private firms,46 a practice that en-
tails the robust delegation of public police authority to private 
actors.47 
II. OUTSOURCING THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTORIAL FUNCTION 
Tough economic times are forcing governments to make  
difficult choices about resource allocation in the criminal justice 
  
 41 Joh, 2005 Utah L Rev at 613 (cited in note 14) (emphasis omitted). 
 42 See id; Philip E. Fixler, Jr., and Robert W. Poole, Jr., Can Police Services Be 
Privatized?, in Bowman et al, eds, Privatizing the United States Justice System at 31–32 
(cited in note 32). 
 43 Id at 32. 
 44 See Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty at 38 & n 112 (cited in note 6) (noting that 
“the Defense Department and GSA employ private guards [at] military and other gov-
ernment properties”); Benson, To Serve and Protect at 18 (cited in note 6); Fixler and 
Poole, Can Police Services Be Privatized? at 32–33 (cited in note 42). 
 45 Benson To Serve and Protect at 18 (cited in note 6); Fixler and Poole, Can Police 
Services Be Privatized? at 33 (cited in note 42). 
 46 See Benson, To Serve and Protect at 18, 20–21 (cited in note 6); Fixler and Poole, 
Can Police Services Be Privatized? at 33–35 (cited in note 42). 
 47 See Joh, 2005 Utah L Rev at 614 (cited in note 14) (“The more a publicly contracted 
police force is organized to replace a public force entirely, the more likely it is that full 
public legal powers and complementary material resources will be made available to it.”). 
  However, jurisdictions have tended to shy away from the complete privatization of 
the police function. In one Michigan example, a jurisdiction contracted with a private firm 
but deputized the individual private personnel to avoid legal issues. See Fixler and Poole, 
Can Police Services Be Privatized? at 33 (cited in note 42). A jurisdiction in Ohio contract-
ed with a private firm for police services, but retained “full autonomy in hiring, firing, 
disciplining, and organizing the police force.” Id at 33–34, quoting T. Gage, Cops, Inc., 
Reason 23–28 (Nov 1982). One jurisdiction in Arizona signed a contract in which it ceded 
all operational decision making to the private contractor, but retained the ability to over-
rule the decisions made. See id at 34. In all of these examples, external pressures eventu-
ally caused the jurisdictions to abort the contractual agreement, rendering the outsourc-
ing arrangements short-lived. See id at 33–34; Benson, To Serve and Protect at 20–21 
(cited in note 6). 
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arena. Many of the resulting budget cuts have been directed to-
ward prosecutors’ offices.48 Consequently, in many jurisdictions, 
reductions in personnel have led to diminished criminal en-
forcement capacity.49 In the face of budgetary challenges, it is 
conceivable that more jurisdictions will consider the sort of  
privatization and outsourcing solutions some have relied upon in 
the prison and policing contexts. 
What might such prosecution outsourcing look like? Should 
we outsource prosecutorial authority—and, more specifically, 
prosecutorial discretion—to private actors? If not, why not? The 
following two thought experiments, in which state and federal 
governments outsource the criminal prosecution function to pri-
vate actors, will serve as a point of departure for the discussion. 
A. North Publica, USA—State Outsourcing of Criminal  
Prosecution 
As part of an attempt to reduce budget costs in the wake of 
declining tax revenues, the legislature of the fictional state of 
North Publica passes a measure authorizing the outsourcing of a 
number of government functions. One of these functions is crim-
inal prosecution. The state legislative research service deter-
mined that, on average, a state criminal prosecutor draws a  
salary of $50,000, and receives health insurance and other em-
ployment benefits worth approximately $25,000. In addition, ini-
tial training and continuing education costs, and the incremental 
costs of office accommodations, secretarial support, and other 
  
 48 See, for example, Kenneth Hart, Prosecutor Offices Feel Pain from Budget Cut, 
Daily Independent (Dec 27, 2008); Donna Leinwand, Cuts Have Prosecutors at “Breaking 
Point,” Some Face Unpaid Leave, Less Support, USA Today 3A (Nov 21, 2008). See also 
Letter from Hon. John Conyers, Jr. and Hon. Henry A. Waxman to Hon. Alberto Gonzales 
(July 24, 2006), online at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/ 
20060724095809-74936.pdf (visited Mar 21, 2010) (noting budget and staffing challenges 
in federal prosecutors’ offices). 
  It should be noted that public defenders’ offices have fallen victim to budget cuts as 
well. See, for example, Adam Liptak, Poor Defendants and a Drained State Budget Cross 
Paths in Georgia, NY Times A13 (July 6, 2010); Josh Richman, Cash-Strapped Alameda 
County Public Defender’s Office Starts Turning Away Cases, San Jose Mercury News (Aug 
3, 2009). Interestingly, this has caused one state public defender’s office to cease reliance 
upon contracting with private attorneys to handle cases presenting a conflict of interest 
for the office. See Marcia Coyle, Cash-Strapped Maryland Public Defender Office Ends 
Contracts With Private Attorneys, Natl L J (Sept 30, 2008). 
 49 See Henry K. Lee, D.A. Cuts Efforts on Lesser Crime, SF Chron B1 (Apr 22, 2009); 
Conor Berry, Budget Questions Loom over DA’s Office, Berkshire Eagle (Feb 4, 2009); 
Jacinda Howard, Public Safety Takes a Big Hit in King County, Federal Way Mirror 
(June 7, 2008), online at http://www.pnwlocalnews.com/south_king/fwm/news/19608489. 
html (visited Aug 7, 2010). 
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associated overhead total approximately $25,000. Therefore, the 
annual per-prosecutor cost to the North Publica treasury is 
$100,000, for a total of $1,000,000 for all of North Publica’s ten 
prosecutors. The legislative research also found that the average 
prosecutor disposes of 100 cases per year, for a per-case labor 
cost of $1,000. 
Various cost-cutting proposals float around, including one 
plan to reduce the number of prosecutors by 80 percent (down to 
two prosecutors) and another plan to eliminate the need for all of 
the North Publica prosecutors. Legislators decide to survey the 
market for legal services to determine their available options. 
Ultimately, a request for proposals (RFP) is issued through vari-
ous bar journals and newsletters in the state. The RFP seeks 
proposals from private lawyers and law firms for contracts to 
handle North Publica’s criminal prosecutions. Offerors are asked 
to describe their qualifications for handling criminal prosecu-
tions, including any past experience with criminal work. All bid-
ders also are required to outline the practical aspects of how the 
criminal prosecutions would be handled as well as the fee struc-
ture for the contract. 
The winning proposal is submitted by the law firm of Henry 
& Bell, LLP, a 120-lawyer firm with six offices across the state. 
Both name partners, John Henry and Edwina Bell, are former 
North Publica prosecutors and have significant criminal defense 
experience. The two senior lawyers are both known for being ex-
cellent supervisors of the young associates in their firm, all of 
whom had been top performers in law school. The proposal speci-
fies that the law firm’s attorneys would prosecute all criminal 
cases on behalf of North Publica in exchange for an annual flat 
fee. 
The proposal also contained a blueprint for how cases would 
proceed with Henry & Bell serving as prosecutor. When the 
North Publica police make an arrest, a lawyer from Henry & Bell 
would be summoned to the courthouse to handle the initial  
appearance and bail hearing. The Henry & Bell lawyer would 
then assess the case and determine whether the prosecution 
should proceed. If the Henry & Bell lawyer decided to charge the  
defendant, Henry & Bell would handle the preliminary hearing, 
plea bargaining and guilty plea (if any), motion to suppress and 
other pre-trial motions, and Henry & Bell would try the case. 
Assuming guilty plea or conviction, Henry & Bell would decide 
on the sentence recommendation and argue in favor of a particu-
lar sentence. If there were a need to defend the conviction on ap-
peal or on collateral review, Henry & Bell would do the briefing 
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and argument, including deciding which positions to take and 
what concessions to make. In cases where the involvement of a 
prosecutor was required prior to arrest and apprehension, Henry 
& Bell would handle all aspects of the investigation, including 
obtaining search warrants, arrest warrants, and wiretaps and 
planning undercover sting operations. 
Henry & Bell would provide all secretarial support, word 
processing, printing, photocopying, office supplies, expert wit-
ness, and laboratory fees training of associates in criminal  
prosecution topics; and all other overhead expenses. In addition, 
Henry & Bell would be solely responsible for the salaries and 
benefits of the lawyers who performed the criminal prosecution 
work on behalf of North Publica. As a result of the contractual 
arrangement, North Publica would save $500,000 annually in 
labor costs associated with criminal prosecution. 
B. US Department of Justice—Federal Outsourcing of Criminal 
Prosecution 
The Attorney General of the United States seeks to reduce 
her workforce and the costs of criminal prosecution. After the 
Congressional Research Service determines that there could be 
significant cost savings associated with the outsourcing of the 
prosecutorial function, she is able to persuade Congress to  
authorize the contracting out of white-collar fraud prosecutions 
to private law firms.50 
The Attorney General engages the 800-lawyer firm of 
Shearman, Gray & Myers to handle the Justice Department’s 
white-collar criminal fraud prosecutions. The contract calls for 
the firm to handle criminal prosecution in white-collar cases at a 
greatly reduced hourly rate. Shearman, Gray & Myers would 
provide all secretarial support, word processing, printing, photo-
copying, office supplies, expert witness and laboratory fees, train-
ing of associates in criminal prosecution topics, and all other 
overhead expenses. In addition, the firm would be solely respon-
  
 50 Although prosecution is thought by most to be an inherently executive function, 
see Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the 
Laws, 104 Yale L J 541, 658–59 (1994). But see Lawrence Lessig and Cass R. Sunstein, 
The President and the Administration, 94 Colum L Rev 1 (1994), the Department of 
Justice and the office of the Attorney General itself are creatures of statute and may be 
regulated by Congress as such. See, for example, Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the 
Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 
1989 Duke L J 561, 566–82. 
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sible for the salaries and benefits of the lawyers who performed 
the criminal prosecution work on behalf of the United States. 
When the Federal Bureau of Investigation or some other 
federal law enforcement or regulatory entity began to investigate 
allegations of white-collar wrongdoing, a consultation between 
the agency and Shearman, Gray & Myers would take place. The 
attorneys and the agents would discuss investigative strategies 
and would sketch out an investigative plan. Shearman, Gray & 
Myers attorneys would work with the agency throughout the in-
vestigation, obtaining any search warrants, arrest warrants, or 
wiretaps they deemed necessary, and directing witness inter-
views and other gathering of evidence. As part of the legislation 
authorizing the outsourcing of the prosecutorial function, the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure would be amended to make 
clear that these private law firm attorneys were to be treated as 
government prosecutors for purposes of gaining access to the 
grand jury and grand jury materials. 
In addition, these private attorneys would be fully author-
ized to sign and file information and complaints to initiate crimi-
nal proceedings in cases not requiring grand jury indictment. All 
charging decisions would be entrusted to Shearman, Gray & 
Myers attorneys, subject only to grand jury or judicial findings of 
probable cause in appropriate cases. 
From the Department’s perspective, the lawyers at the law 
firm could do the work at a fraction of the cost of public, full-time 
prosecutors. From the law firm’s perspective, although the work 
would not be as lucrative as the full-fee matters it handled for 
private clients, the criminal prosecution work would always be 
present, providing a solid source of billable hours for the firm’s 
lawyers, particularly in a down economy. Furthermore, the  
criminal prosecutions would provide an excellent opportunity for 
junior lawyers at the law firm to “cut their teeth” in courtroom 
litigation. 
These two hypothetical scenarios may seem far-fetched to 
those of us who value and endorse the public prosecution norm. 
The thought of private lawyers being contracted to perform the 
seemingly exclusive state function of prosecuting violations of 
the criminal law is somewhat jarring. However, as is discussed 
below, these two thought experiments are actually grounded in 
the present reality within many smaller jurisdictions around the 
United States. 
 9/12/2010 5:31:33 AM 
280 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2010: 
C. Outsourcing the Prosecutorial Function to Private Actors 
Governments outsource a significant amount of legal work.51 
Instead of using the often sizable stables of in-house lawyers—of 
the city solicitor’s office, state Attorney General’s office, or 
Department of Justice—governments sometimes decide to con-
tract their legal work out to the private sector, a classic example 
of outsourcing. Governments on the local, state, and federal  
levels have contracted with private lawyers to handle all manner 
of government lawsuits—relating to matters from antitrust and 
tobacco to lead paint and handguns52—often on a contingency fee 
basis.53 Private lawyers also are sometimes retained to assist 
government lawyers with civil enforcement activities.54 This 
“outsourcing” description also holds for those instances where 
government entities contract out criminal prosecution to the  
private sector. 
Surprisingly, a significant amount of prosecution out-
sourcing already is being undertaken by smaller jurisdictions 
  
 51 See Ronald D. Rotunda, Ethical Problems in Federal Agency Hiring of Private 
Attorneys, 1 Georgetown J Legal Ethics 85, 85 (1987) (“While the federal government 
employs a very large in-house staff of over 17,000 attorneys to handle its legal problems, 
it nevertheless spends over twenty-five million dollars a year to hire outside counsel to 
represent its interests.”) (internal citations omitted). But see William V. Luneburg, 
Contracting by the Federal Government for Legal Services: A Legal and Empirical Analy-
sis, 63 Notre Dame L Rev 399, 399 (1988) (“Contracting for legal services by the Federal 
Government has been, and continues to be, the exception rather than the rule.”). 
 52 See, for example, Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on 
Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 
34 UC Davis L Rev 1, 17, 35 (2000); John C. Coffee, Jr., “When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes”: 
Myth and Reality about the Synthesis of Private Counsel and Public Client, 51 DePaul L 
Rev 241, 241, 243 (2001); Rotunda, 1 Georgetown J Legal Ethics at 85 (cited in note 51); 
Jenna Greene, Cadwalader Slashed Rates for Treasury Work, Natl L J 27 (Oct 12, 2009) 
(reporting on law firm’s reduction of its attorneys’ hourly rates for work on behalf of U.S. 
Treasury Department’s Troubled Assets Relief Program). 
 53 See, for example, County of Santa Clara v Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 
235 P3d 21 (Cal 2010) (approving contingency fees for private firms hired to assist gov-
ernment attorneys in some public nuisance cases, but noting that due process would 
likely bar the use of contingency fees for criminal prosecutions); Priceline.com, Inc v City 
of Anaheim, 180 Cal App 4th 1130, 103 Cal Rptr 3d 521 (2010) (approving contingency 
fees for private firms hired to assist government attorneys in tax assessment litigation). 
Jurisdictions sometimes engage outside counsel on a pro bono basis. See, for example, 
Mark Scarcella, Outside Counsel Worked Landmark Gun Case Pro Bono, Blog of Legal 
Times (May 20, 2010), online at http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/05/dc-says-
outside-counsel-worked-handgun-case-pro-bono.html (visited Sept 11, 2010). 
 54 Telephone Interview with Betsy Miller, Esq. (private law firm attorney with prac-
tice representing governmental entities in civil matters) (Apr 27, 2010). Miller stressed 
that, in her experience, state attorneys general who retain the assistance of private law-
yers are bound by statute and custom to maintain control over the strategy and direction 
of the matters. See id. 
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across the nation.55 These governments, with limited budgets for 
criminal justice administration, often turn to the private bar for 
prosecution services. Rather than spend scarce resources on a 
traditional public prosecutor, some governments will pay private 
lawyers or law firms to prosecute criminal matters within the 
jurisdiction. 
Prosecution outsourcing arrangements take a number of dif-
ferent forms. Some governments contract with private law firms 
to handle criminal prosecutions on an hourly fee basis, much like 
the arrangement depicted above in the federal outsourcing 
thought experiment.56 For example, the city of Davis, California 
recently entered into an agreement with a California law firm 
that paid the firm $180 per hour for a variety of legal services, 
including the “[p]rosecution of municipal code violations.”57 
Other prosecution outsourcing arrangements simply pay a 
private lawyer or law firm a fee for each criminal prosecution 
they handle. An example of this type of compensation scheme 
can be found in the city of Sequim, Washington, which pays a 
private attorney to handle criminal appeals “at a flat rate of $300 
per individual case.”58 
Still other outsourcing arrangements, like that imagined in 
the “North Publica” thought experiment above,59 have a private 
lawyer or law firm prosecute all of the criminal cases in a juris-
diction for a flat annual fee. The town of Albany, Oregon has paid 
a private law firm an annual flat fee of over $200,000 for prose-
cution and other legal services.60 
  
 55 There are other examples of private influence on, or control over, criminal prosecu-
tion, such as victim-retained private prosecution and part-time prosecution. See Roger A. 
Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private Actors, 43 UC 
Davis L Rev 411, 419–24 (2009). Furthermore, it is tempting to draw analogies between 
qui tam actions and prosecution outsourcing. But see id at 425 n 44 (pointing out funda-
mental distinctions between prosecution outsourcing and qui tam actions); John D. 
Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 Ark L 
Rev 511, 595 (1994) (“Even if the Supreme Court refuses to declare the use of private 
prosecutors unconstitutional in all cases, an interested prosecutor’s participation at trial 
must invalidate any conviction obtained for any serious offense.”). Although there are a 
number of common attributes among the various species of the private role in criminal 
prosecution, see Fairfax, 43 UC Davis L Rev at 425–27 (cited in note 53), the focus of this 
Article is limited to prosecution outsourcing. 
 56 See Part II.B. 
 57 Agreement for Legal Services, City of Davis, California and McDonough, Holland & 
Allen, PC (2006), online at http://cityofdavis.org/meetings/councilpackets/20060110/ 
05D_City_Attorney_Contract.pdf (visited Mar 17, 2010). 
 58 Agreement for Prosecuting Attorney Services, City of Sequim, Washington (2003), 
online at http://www.mrsc.org/contracts/s46ProsAttSvcs.pdf (visited Mar 17, 2010). 
 59 See Part II.A. 
 60 See Contract between Albany, Oregon and Long, Delapoer, Healy & McCann, PC 
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Often an elected mayor or county executive or appointed city 
administrator will engage the criminal prosecution services of a 
private law firm pursuant to a negotiated agreement or following 
a request for proposal process.61 Although the reputation and 
professional ability of the private firm obviously factor promi-
nently into the selection, the desire to reduce costs and enhance 
efficiency through the contract is a significant consideration.62 
Jurisdictions with relatively small populations may not have 
the tax base to support a public prosecutor. In addition, the 
crime rate in a sparsely populated community may not justify 
the expenditure for a traditional full-time public prosecutor. Fur-
thermore, privatizing criminal prosecution in these jurisdictions 
can increase criminal prosecution capacity, which, in turn, might 
enhance efficiency, public safety, and fairness by speeding crimi-
nal case processing, reducing crime, saving court administration 
costs, and diminishing the human and financial costs of pretrial 
detention. 
Although much of current prosecution outsourcing is limited 
to smaller jurisdictions and less serious criminal offenses, larger 
jurisdictions very well may take note of the perceived benefits. 
Government budgets are being reduced across the board, includ-
  
(2005) (on file with U Chi Legal F). 
 61 See, for example, City of North Bend, Washington and Kenyon Disend, PLLC, 
Resolution 1174 (Jan 16, 2007) online at http://www.mrsc.org/contracts/N66legal.pdf 
(visited Sept 11, 2010); City of Sequim, Washington, Request for Proposal for 
Prosecutorial Services, online at http://www.mrsc.org/rfps/s46prosattysvcs.pdf (visited 
Sept 11, 2010) (proposal for a contract that would acquire the services of a private attor-
ney to prosecute alleged criminals on behalf of the city); City Council of Northfield, 
Minnesota, Approve RFP for Prosecuting City Attorney Services, online at 
http://www.ci.northfield.mn.us/assets/p/Packet145.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2010) (same). 
 62 See Telephone Interview with Scott Neal, City Manager of Eden Prairie, MN (Mar 
2, 2010) (noting cost savings as the primary motivation for prosecution outsourcing in his 
jurisdiction); Rupa Shenoy, Prosecutors Caught between Cost-Cutting and Profiteering, 
Minnesota Public Radio (Mar 26, 2010). 
  As with outsourcing more generally, see Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: 
Privatization, Public-ization and Public Values, 15 Cornell J L & Pub Pol 111, 113 (2005), 
there are various motivations for governmental outsourcing of legal services, including 
efficiency, cost savings, and, in certain matters, the need for the expertise possessed by a 
particular member of the private bar. See, for example, Patrick McFadden, Note, The 
First Thing We Do, Let’s Outsource All the Lawyers: An Essay, 33 Pub Cont L J 443, 443 
(2004) (“There is no compelling reason why government lawyers should be exempt from 
consideration in [the] outsourcing process. The same arguments that support outsourcing 
of other services support outsourcing of government legal services.”). See also id at 444–
48 (citing efficiency, expertise, and quality of service as rationales for government out-
sourcing of legal services); Lawrence, 61 Ind L J at 656–57 (cited in note 3) (“Persons with 
certain kinds of expertise may be too expensive for government to employ or may prefer 
less structured work environments than government can offer. Private delegation may be 
a practical method of obtaining that sort of otherwise unavailable expertise.”). 
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ing in vital areas such as criminal prosecution.63 Such budget 
cuts no doubt hamper the ability of jurisdictions to provide opti-
mal levels of law enforcement.64 Given difficult economic condi-
tions and increasing criminal justice demands, larger jurisdic-
tions may consider the sort of outsourcing imagined in the 
thought experiments above. 
III. CONCERNS WITH PROSECUTION OUTSOURCING 
A. Accountability and Transparency 
Prosecution outsourcing raises concerns about accountability 
and transparency. Most chief prosecutors in the United States 
are elected, with the remainder directly appointed by elected of-
ficials, sometimes with the confirmation of legislative bodies.65 
Perhaps the primary rationale for the tremendous discretion en-
joyed by prosecutors is their accountability to the communities in 
whose name they enforce the criminal laws.66 Prosecutors wield 
enormous power in deciding whether and what to prosecute. 
Their decisions have long-lasting consequences not only for puta-
tive criminal defendants and victims of criminal conduct, but 
also for law enforcement strategy, correctional resource alloca-
tion, and social policy more generally. 
When private actors are contracted to perform the prosecu-
tion function, they exercise this power without the democratic 
check that theoretically applies to public prosecutors.67 
  
 63 See, for example, Hart, Prosecutor Offices Feel Pain from Budget Cut (cited in note 
48) (describing recent cutbacks in funding for government prosecutorial functions); Berry, 
Budget Questions Loom over DA’s Office, Berkshire Eagle (cited in note 49) (noting that 
district attorney positions may need to be cut in the face of budget reductions); Howard, 
Public Safety Takes a Big Hit in King County, Federal Way Mirror (cited in note 49) 
(budget cut forces downsizing of approximately 30 assistant district attorneys, or one-
sixth of prosecutorial staff ). 
 64 See, for example, Lee, D.A. Cuts Efforts on Lesser Crimes, SF Chron B1 (cited in 
note 49) (district attorney forced to decline all misdemeanor and small-quantity drug 
prosecutions among other types of cases); Leinwand, Cuts Have Prosecutors “at Breaking 
Point,” Some Face Unpaid Leave, Less Support, USA Today 3A (cited in note 48) (discuss-
ing the nationwide scope of recent budget cutbacks). 
 65 See Angela J. Davis, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor 10–
11 (Oxford 2007) (“Mississippi was the first state to hold public elections for district at-
torneys. By 1912, almost every state had followed this trend. Today, only the District of 
Columbia and four states—Delaware, New Jersey, Rhode Island and Connecticut—
maintain a system of appointed prosecutors.”) 
 66 See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification? (unpublished manuscript, 
2010) (on file with author). 
 67 It must be recognized, however, that there is a good deal of scholarly skepticism 
regarding the prosecutorial accountability that the democratic process provides. See 
Davis, Arbitrary Justice at 163–66 (cited in note 63) (outlining arguments that have been 
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Furthermore, because private contractors perform most non-
courtroom tasks in private offices away from public spaces and 
actors and are not subject to government information disclosure 
laws, there is even less transparency than we enjoy with regard 
to public prosecutors.68 
Of course, the fact that prosecution outsourcing contracts 
are negotiated and monitored by elected or otherwise politically 
accountable officials may provide some degree of accountability.69 
Additionally, because public expenditures theoretically are sub-
ject to public scrutiny, there may be demands upon private con-
tractors to increase access to internal office procedures and deci-
sion making.70 Nevertheless, prosecution outsourcing diminishes 
the sort of accountability and transparency demanded of, and 
theoretically provided by, public prosecutors. 
B. Underperformance 
Related to the accountability concerns raised by prosecution 
outsourcing is the worry that it may be difficult to ensure ade-
quate performance of outsourced prosecutors. There are tremen-
dous demands on the time of lawyers in private practice. A pri-
vate firm may have litigation, transactional, or administrative 
  
put forth that the democratic process of electing district attorneys does not have a suffi-
cient abuse deterrence effect); Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 
Ohio St J Crim L 581, 583 (2009); Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipu-
lating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 Va L Rev 939, 963 (1997). 
 68 See Fairfax, 43 UC Davis L Rev at 444 (cited in note 53) (“[T]he decision making 
processes of public prosecutors are notoriously opaque.”), citing Angela J. Davis, The 
American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 Iowa L Rev 
393, 448 (2001); Marc L. Miller and Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 Iowa L Rev 125, 
129 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (“[T]he absence of controlling statutes or case law 
makes it possible for prosecutors to do their daily work without explaining their choices to 
the public.”). 
 69 For example, the performance of Henry & Bell lawyers under the outsourcing 
arrangement depicted in the above thought experiment presumably would be reviewed by 
the governor and the legislature at the time of contract renewal. 
  Indeed, the city manager in one jurisdiction that outsources its misdemeanor pros-
ecutions to private law firms touts the ability of the city to withdraw from the contract 
with ninety days notice if the city is unsatisfied with the contractor’s performance. See 
Telephone Interview with Scott Neal (cited in note 62). 
 70 For instance, in our Henry & Bell thought experiment, North Publica might re-
quire frequent reporting by the contracting firm on its decisionmaking processes related 
to the criminal case dispositions. 
  One former “private prosecutor” recalls that her private law firm, which handled 
criminal cases for one Minnesota jurisdiction, was subject to formal annual reviews and 
more frequent informal performance reviews by the city manager and police department 
command staff. See Telephone Interview with Jennifer Inz, Esq. (currently a public pros-
ecutor in Hennepin County, Minnesota, who previously prosecuted criminal offenses for a 
Minnesota jurisdiction for 17 years under an outsourcing contract as a private law firm 
attorney) (Apr 27, 2010). 
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matters taking place in far-flung venues and geographic regions. 
Private law firms must generate sufficient revenues to pay not 
only lawyer salaries and overhead, but the costs associated with 
maintaining support staff. Although the government obviously 
must meet payroll and pay overhead expenses, the practice deci-
sions of individual government lawyers are not burdened with 
such financial considerations. 
Such pressures might affect a private lawyer’s prosecutorial 
performance in a number of ways. The demands of the contrac-
tor’s private matters could monopolize the attorney’s time, leav-
ing the criminal prosecution matters without the appropriate 
focus and attention. For example, Henry & Bell in the above 
thought experiment might place criminal prosecution matters on 
the back burner in order to accommodate work on behalf of a pri-
vate client, particularly if the private client work is more lucra-
tive. This could mean improper delays in the prosecution or pro-
cessing of criminal cases, leading to court system backlogs, un-
fair treatment of pretrial detainees, and even speedy trial issues. 
Just as troubling is the possibility that Henry & Bell might 
begin to plead out cases for lesser sanctions than would normally 
be deemed appropriate, in order to clear the decks for more pri-
vate client work. Of course, a firm presumably would not engage 
in a prosecution outsourcing arrangement if the firm believed 
that the arrangement might hinder its ability to service private 
clients. However, new clients and fresh matters arise all the 
time, and circumstances can change dramatically after the out-
sourcing agreement has been executed. 
C. Ethical Concerns 
There are also ethical concerns that can arise when a private 
lawyer is entrusted with criminal prosecution authority. There 
has long been strong support among reformers for the full-time 
public prosecution norm because of the tremendous potential for 
conflicts of interest when prosecutors also represent private cli-
ents. It is not difficult to recognize the conflict that would be  
created were Henry & Bell or Shearman, Gray, & Myers to rep-
resent criminal defendants in a jurisdiction in which those firms 
contracted to prosecute criminal cases.71 Although such direct 
  
 71 In addition to the problems such a dual role would pose for the prosecution func-
tion, the Henry & Bell attorneys would be vulnerable to ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim for breach of duty of loyalty. See Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 (1984) (pre-
suming prejudice when defense counsel represents conflicting interests). 
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conflicts can be avoided by requiring contractor firms to recuse 
themselves from all criminal defense matters in the jurisdic-
tion,72 the danger of conflicts of interest do not end there. A firm 
could show favoritism in a criminal case to one of its private civil 
clients, or might use the discretionary power of criminal  
investigation and prosecution as a weapon against a civil  
litigation adversary. 
In addition, some reasonably may be concerned that private 
lawyers will be more susceptible to corrupting influences than 
will public prosecutors. There is the aforementioned concern that 
a private lawyer may use her criminal prosecution authority to 
cow an adversary into submission in an unrelated civil matter. In 
addition, the performance pressures associated with maintaining 
a potentially lucrative criminal prosecution contract with a juris-
diction could create incentives to win conviction at all costs,73 
even through misconduct. Although it must be conceded that 
there may be incentives for public prosecutors to ignore their 
duty to ensure “that justice shall be done,”74 the perception—if 
not the reality—of the increased danger of corruption and con-
flicts of interest associated with prosecution outsourcing is cause 
for particular concern. 
D. Potential Constitutional Constraints 
The sort of prosecution outsourcing illustrated in the above 
thought experiment arguably is in tension with certain con-
stitutional norms. Although governments enjoy broad authority 
to outsource public functions,75 and courts have been fairly liber-
al in approving delegations of government power to private ac-
tors,76 privatization scholars often point to various constitutional 
  
 72 But see Telephone Interview with Jennifer Inz, Esq. (cited in note 70) (noting that 
private prosecutors in Eden Prairie, MN are permitted to represent criminal defendants). 
 73 A National Public Radio affiliate story on prosecution outsourcing recounted that a 
winning bidder for a prosecution outsourcing contract stated in its proposal that it would 
increase the city’s revenues by seeking court-imposed “prosecution costs” from defend-
ants. Prosecution costs, which are directed to the jurisdiction’s coffers, are imposed in 
cases in which the prosecutor agrees to a conditional dismissal of a defendant’s case in 
exchange for the defendant’s compliance with certain requirements and the payment of 
the fee. See Shenoy, Prosecutors Caught between Cost-Cutting and Profiteering (cited in 
note 62). 
 74 Berger v United States, 295 US 78, 88 (1935). See also Fairfax, UC Davis L Rev at 
440–41 (cited in note 53). 
 75 See Freeman, 75 NYU L Rev at 581 (cited in note 6) (“The federal government thus 
retains considerable flexibility to make substantial delegations of its responsibilities, and 
even of functions closely associated with core sovereign powers, to private parties.”). 
 76 See, for example, Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1375, 1440 (cited in note 1). See 
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restrictions on such delegations—including due process, equal 
protection, separation of powers, and nondelegation principles.77 
In addition to the problems inherent in the private exercise 
of sovereign power,78 allowing private lawyers to wield prosecu-
torial authority raises fairness concerns.79 One concern is that 
private attorneys will not be able to check improper incentives 
influencing their exercise of discretion. Among these are the  
financial and professional incentives to perform well (that is, 
seek and obtain convictions) in order to enhance professional 
reputation for the purpose of maintaining and developing other 
areas of practice. 
As was discussed above, conflicts of interest on the part of 
the private attorney discharging prosecutorial duties may raise 
due process concerns serious enough to warrant reversal of a 
defendant’s conviction.80 For example, a contracted prosecutor’s 
desire to benefit a client with interests at stake in a given  
prosecution could result in prejudice to a criminal defendant. 
Additionally, corruption in the prosecutorial decision-
making process, resulting in bias, favor, or prejudice would give 
rise to fairness concerns which could implicate both the Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection Clauses.81 Another fairness concern 
derives from the notion that when two private adversaries liti-
gate, neither should wield the power of the state.82 This relates 
  
also Lawrence, 61 Ind L J at 660 (cited in note 3). 
 77 See, for example, Freeman, 75 NYU L Rev at 632 (cited in note 6); Metzger, 103 
Colum L Rev at 1437–38 (cited in note 1) (“This same due process concern exists in the 
federal context, but here separation of powers constitutes an additional potential barrier 
to delegation of power to private actors.”). See also Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty at 15 
(cited in note 6) (“[W]hen the Congress subdelegates to the president or the agencies or 
the president further delegates to private parties, the Constitution still umpires the rela-
tionships.”). But see Stanger, One Nation under Contract 26 (cited in note 2) (“The 
Constitution is largely mute on what the founders thought about the proper balance 
between private and public interests.”). See also Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the 
Delegation Doctrine on Prison Privatization, 35 UCLA L Rev 911 (1988) (discussing fed-
eral and state nondelegation doctrines). 
 78 See Part III.E below. 
 79 See, for example, Robert M. Ireland, Privately Funded Prosecution of Crime in the 
Nineteenth-Century United States, 39 Am J Legal Hist 43, 58 (1995) (“Conversely, a writ-
er in the North Carolina Law Review in 1972 called for an end to private prosecution, 
contending that it violated due process, the canons of ethics, and the modern role of the 
prosecutor.”). 
 80 See Part III.C above. Compare Pierce, 76 Geo Wash L Rev at 1221 (cited in note 1). 
 81 See Lawrence, 61 Ind L J at 661–62 & n 59 (cited in note 3); Ganger v Peyton, 379 
F2d 709 (4th Cir 1967). 
 82 See, for example, Joan Meier, The “Right” to a Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal 
Contempt: Unpacking Public and Private Interests, 70 Wash U L Q 85, 108 (1992) (“Pri-
vate prosecution is seen as unfair to defendants in two respects. First, it is argued that 
the criminal prosecutor has the ‘full machinery of the state’ at his or her command, and 
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not only to equity considerations vis-à-vis the accused,83 but also 
to society’s conception of whether and when it is appropriate for 
private parties to wield state power. 
Another set of constitutional values potentially implicated 
by the contracting out of the prosecution function to private  
attorneys may be found, at least in the federal context, in separa-
tion of powers and nondelegation doctrines. For example, some 
commentators point to the Appointments Clause of the United 
States Constitution,84 which provides: 
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges 
of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United 
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise 
provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but 
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such 
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President 
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of 
Departments.85 
The Appointments Clause is designed, in part, “to preserve polit-
ical accountability relative to important government assign-
ments.”86 Paul Verkuil describes the Appointments Clause as a 
“democracy-forcing requirement” established in part “to check 
the exercise of private power on government.”87 
When the executive contracts out the prosecution of crime to 
a private party, he or she is, in a very real sense, delegating that 
function outside of the constitutional structure. Of course, the 
constitutional mandate that the executive “take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed” does not require that the president 
himself or herself actually prosecute criminal offenses against 
the state;88 the President may delegate this responsibility verti-
cally to principal and inferior officers.89 However, when the exec-
  
that use of such powers for private advantage is inherently unfair to defendants.”). 
 83 But see id at 109–10 (highlighting arguments that even public prosecution does not 
ensure fairness for criminal defendants). 
 84 See Freeman, 75 NYU L Rev at 585–86 (cited in note 6). See also Field, 15 Hofstra 
L Rev at 656 & n 52 (cited in note 34). 
 85 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2. 
 86 Edmond v United States, 520 US 651, 663 (1997). 
 87 Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty 106 (cited in note 6). But see Pierce, 76 Geo 
Wash L Rev at 1220 (cited in note 1). 
 88 US Const Art II, § 3, cl 4. 
 89 See Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty, at 102–03 (cited in note 6). See also 
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utive delegates an executive function beyond the constitutional 
boundaries of the executive branch,90 constitutional constraints 
on such delegations may be implicated.91 
For example, the Department of Justice Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) has long maintained the view that “purely minis-
terial and internal functions . . . which neither affect the legal 
rights of third parties outside the Government nor involve the 
exercise of significant policymaking authority may be performed 
by persons who are not federal officers or employees.”92 However, 
OLC has been equally consistent in the view that “the authority 
to direct litigation on behalf of the United States may not be 
vested in persons who are not officers of the United States ap-
pointed in the proper manner under [the Appointments 
Clause].”93 Analyzing the Supreme Court’s prominent treatment 
  
Constitutional Limits on “Contracting Out” Department of Justice Functions under OMB 
Circular A-76, 14 Op Off Legal Counsel 94, 96, 1990 WL 488475 at *2 (1990). 
 90 Scholars have debated whether prosecution is an inherently executive function. 
See, for example, Davis, 86 Iowa L Rev at 453–55 (cited in note 66) (“The prosecutorial 
function falls within the executive branch of the government. . . . The framers viewed a 
strong, unitary executive as advancing accountability because a fragmented executive 
branch could more easily escape review.”); Calabresi and Prakash, 104 Yale L J at 658–51 
(cited in note 50). But see Lessig and Sunstein, 94 Colum L Rev at 1 (cited in note 50); 
William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers and the Federal Courts, 
57 Geo Wash L Rev 474, 485, 494, 500 (1989). See also Office of Legal Counsel, 
Constitutional Limits on “Contracting Out” Department of Justice Functions under OMB 
Circular A-76 at 96 (cited in note 89) (collecting cases). 
 91 Although authorities are in accord that such delegations do implicate constitution-
al values, there are varying views as to which constitutional values are implicated. See, 
for example, Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty at 103 (cited in note 6) (“If the president 
assigns duties to private contractors that are normally performed by either principal or 
‘inferior’ officers of the United States, the vertical dimension of separation of powers is 
triggered.”); Office of Legal Counsel, The Constitutional Separation of Powers between the 
President and Congress, 20 Op Off Legal Counsel 124, 1996 WL 876050 at *14 (May 7, 
1996), online at http://www.justice.gov/olc/delly.htm (visited Sept 11, 2010) (“The 
Appointments Clause simply is not implicated when significant authority is devolved 
upon non-federal actors.”); id at *14 n 60 (“The delegation to private persons or non-
federal government officials of federal-law authority, sometimes incorrectly analyzed as 
raising Appointments Clause questions, can raise genuine questions under other consti-
tutional doctrines, such as the non-delegation doctrine and the general separation of 
powers principle.”); id at *14 (“[T]he simple assignment [to private individuals] of some 
duties under federal law, even significant ones, does not by itself pose an Appointments 
Clause problem.”). See also id at *14 n 62. 
 92 Office of Legal Counsel, Constitutional Limits on “Contracting Out” Department of 
Justice Functions under OMB Circular A-76 at 94, 99 (cited in note 89). 
 93 As the Office of Legal Counsel has stated: 
There has always been in this Office a basic question whether it is appropriate 
for the Attorney General (or the President) to contract out the litigation respon-
sibility of the United States. . . . [O]n the constitutional level, we have long as-
serted that the making of litigation judgments (variously described as prosecu-
torial discretion or litigation management) is a function at the core of the Presi-
dent’s Article II duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and 
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of the Appointments Clause in Buckley v Valeo,94 the Office of 
Legal Counsel concluded that the restriction of litigation to  
“officers” applies in the criminal context.95 Therefore, it can  
be argued, unless the private lawyer to whom prosecutorial  
authority is delegated is an “officer,” such a delegation would 
contravene the Constitution.96 
E. Government Contracting Law Norms 
In addition, a body of statutory and regulatory law has de-
veloped around government “contracting out” of public functions. 
What, if anything, does the positive law of government outsourc-
ing have to say about the contracting out of the prosecution func-
tion? Although these laws scarcely address the outsourcing of the 
prosecution function, the statutes and regulations governing the 
bulk of government contracting reflect certain norms related to 
the outsourcing of core government functions. Prosecution out-
sourcing is in serious tension with such norms.97 
The Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 
(“FAIR”) distinguishes between “inherently governmental func-
tions” and other functions, the latter residual category being sub-
ject to competition with the private sector for potential outsourc-
  
must, therefore, be performed by those who serve under, and are responsible ul-
timately to, the President. 
Office of Legal Counsel, Application of Conflict of Interest Rules to the Conduct of 
Government Litigation by Private Attorneys, 4B Op Off Legal Counsel 434, 1980 WL 
20939 (Feb 22, 1980). See also Office of Legal Counsel, Constitutional Limits on “Con-
tracting Out” Department of Justice Functions under OMB Circular A-76 (cited in note 
89). 
 94 424 US 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 95 Office of Legal Counsel, Constitutional Limits on “Contracting Out” Department of 
Justice Functions under OMB Circular A-76 at 94, 99 (cited in note 89). 
 96 See Luneburg, 63 Notre Dame L Rev at 401–02 (cited in note 51) (“Moreover, gov-
ernmental policy-making itself is a function that must ultimately be vested, if not in 
Congress, then in the President or an ‘Officer of the United States’ appointed in the man-
ner prescribed by Article II of the Constitution. To the extent that the activities of a pri-
vate attorney retained by the government can be considered to involve policy making, the 
need for sufficient control by ‘officers’ of the United States is . . . present.”). 
 97 The author is mindful that serious analytical limitations constrain the full applica-
tion of the statutory and regulatory outsourcing regime to prosecution outsourcing. One 
issue is that some of the laws apply only when government is seeking to replace existing 
public employees with private contractors. To the extent that any prosecution outsourcing 
would simply seek to supplement the existing public prosecutorial corps with private 
contractors (rather than replace them), some laws would not apply. Another such limita-
tion is that much of the law is largely aspirational. Finally, as this Article acknowledges, 
see note 118 below, the federal outsourcing regulatory regime does not apply to state and 
local outsourcing. However, the policy norms underlying the outsourcing laws (regulating 
the public private distinction) can be instructive to state governments not necessarily 
subject to similar legal constraints. 
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ing.98 The statute defines an “inherently governmental” function 
as “a function that is so intimately related to the public interest 
as to require performance by Federal Government employees.”99 
The statute specifically enumerates certain functions that are 
“inherently governmental,” including “activities that require  
either the exercise of discretion in applying Federal Government 
authority or the making of value judgments in making decisions 
for the Federal Government . . . .”100 FAIR goes on to explain that 
“[a]n inherently governmental function involves, among other 
things, the interpretation and execution of laws of the United 
States so as . . . to determine, protect, and advance United States 
economic, political, territorial, property, or other interests by civ-
il or criminal judicial proceedings . . .; [or] . . . to significantly af-
fect the life, liberty, or property of private persons . . . .”101 
FAIR, although not explicitly ruling out the outsourcing of 
inherently governmental functions,102 could reasonably be read 
to assume that the practice is not authorized. In any event, the 
definition of “inherently governmental functions” excluded from 
FAIR’s competitive sourcing plan would certainly seem to include 
a potential contracting out of criminal prosecution. The statute’s 
references to “exercise of discretion,” the determination of federal 
interests by “criminal judicial proceedings,” and “significantly 
affect[ing] the life, liberty, or property of private persons” all 
would militate in favor of the conclusion that prosecution would 
be considered an “inherently governmental function.” 
The language of the Federal Acquisition Regulations 
(“FAR”), which apply to federal executive agency procurement, 
supports even more concretely the view that criminal prosecution 
is an “inherently governmental function” under federal out-
sourcing law. The FAR is clear in its policy stance against con-
tracting out certain core government functions: “Contracts shall 
not be used for the performance of inherently governmental func-
  
 98 See Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, Pub L No 105-270, 112 Stat 
2382, codified at 31 USC § 501 note [hereinafter “FAIR Act”]; Stanger, One Nation under 
Contract 15 (cited in note 2); Mathew Blum, The Federal Framework for Competing 
Commercial Work, in Freeman and Minow, eds, Government by Contract at 66 (cited in 
note 6). 
 99 FAIR Act, 31 USC § 501 note § 5(2)(A). 
 100 FAIR Act, 31 USC § 501 note § 5(2)(B). 
 101 FAIR Act, 31 USC § 501 note § 5(2)(B). 
 102 See, for example, Blum, The Federal Framework at 66 (cited in note 94); John 
Cibinic and Ralph C. Nash, Contracting Out Procurement Functions: The “Inherently 
Governmental Function” Exception, 14 No 9 Nash & Cibinic Rep 45 (2000). 
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tions.”103 The regulations contain a non-exhaustive “list of exam-
ples of functions considered to be inherently governmental func-
tions or which shall be treated as such.” At the top of this list, 
which includes “[t]he command of military forces,”104 “[t]he con-
duct of foreign relations,”105 and the “performance of adjudicatory 
functions,”106 are “(1) [t]he direct conduct of criminal investiga-
tions”107 and “(2) [t]he control of prosecutions.”108 
The FAR also contains provisions specific to service con-
tracts. A service contract is defined as a “contract that directly 
engages the time and effort of a contractor whose primary pur-
pose is to perform an identifiable task rather than to furnish an 
end item of supply.”109 Therefore, a private lawyer contracted to 
conduct a criminal prosecution might be considered to have a 
service contract under the FAR. Here, the FAR states that 
“[a]gencies shall not award a contract for the performance of an 
inherently governmental function,”110 and makes reference to the 
earlier list for guidance on what is an inherently governmental 
function.111 Thus, the FAR demonstrates outsourcing law’s cate-
gorical inclusion of the prosecution function as one of those in-
herently governmental functions that should not be contracted 
out to the private sector. 
Another key interpretive tool, OMB Circular No. A-76, is 
published by the Office of Budget and Management as policy 
guidance for competitive sourcing requirements.112 This publica-
tion contains a number of relevant and informative provisions. 
After stating the clear policy that agencies shall “[p]erform in-
herently governmental activities with government personnel,”113 
  
 103 48 CFR § 7.503(a). 
 104 48 CFR § 7.503(c)(3). 
 105 48 CFR § 7.503(c)(4). 
 106 48 CFR § 7.503(c)(2). The regulation, however, specifically excludes those adjudica-
tory functions “relating to arbitration or other methods of alternative dispute resolution.” 
48 CFR § 7.503(c)(2). 
 107 48 CFR § 7.503(c)(1). 
 108 48 CFR § 7.503(c)(2). 
 109 48 CFR § 37.101. 
 110 48 CFR § 37.102(c). 
 111 48 CFR § 37.102(c). 
 112 The recent versions of Circular No. A-76 have changed substantially. The admin-
istration of President George W. Bush renamed “outsourcing” as “competitive sourcing” 
and added it to the President’s management agenda. See generally Steven L. Schooner, 
Competitive Sourcing Policy: More Sail Than Rudder?, 33 Pub Cont L J 263 (2004). 
 113 Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-76 (revised) 1 (May 29, 2003), 
online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/a076/ 
a76_incl_tech_correction.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2010). An earlier version of the Circular 
elaborated more fully on this policy: 
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Circular A-76 goes on to define “inherently governmental  
activities”: 
An inherently governmental activity is an activity that is 
so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate 
performance by government personnel. These activities 
require the exercise of substantial discretion in applying 
government authority and/or in making decisions for the 
government. Inherently governmental activities normally 
fall into two categories: the exercise of sovereign govern-
ment authority or the establishment of procedures and 
processes related to the oversight of monetary trans-
actions or entitlements. An inherently governmental  
activity involves: . . . 
(1) Binding the United States to take or not to take 
some action by contract, policy, regulation, authoriza-
tion, order, or otherwise; 
(2) Determining, protecting, and advancing economic, 
political, territorial, property, or other interests by . . . 
civil or criminal judicial proceedings . . .; 
(3) Significantly affecting the life, liberty, or property 
of private persons . . . .114 
  
b. Retain Governmental Functions In-House. Certain functions are inherently 
Governmental in nature, being so intimately related to the public interest as to 
mandate performance only by Federal employees. These functions are not in 
competition with the commercial sector. Therefore, these functions shall be per-
formed by Government employees. 
Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-76 (revised) *1–2 (Aug 4, 1983) (on file 
with U Chi Legal F). 
 114 Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-76 (revised) A-2 (May 29, 2003). 
The 1983 revision of the Circular, which was generally aggressive in its promotion of 
outsourcing, see Stanger, One Nation Under Contract 15 (cited in note 2), nevertheless 
was explicit in the notion that criminal prosecution is an “inherently governmental func-
tion”: 
e. An inherently Governmental function is a function which is so intimately re-
lated to the public interest as to mandate performance by Government employ-
ees . . . . [T]hese functions include those activities which require either the exer-
cise of discretion in applying Government authority or the use of value judg-
ment in making decisions for the Government. . . . Inherently Governmental 
functions usually fall into two categories: 
(1) The act of governing; i.e., the discretionary exercise of Government au-
thority. Examples include criminal investigations, prosecutions and other 
judicial functions . . .” 
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Here again we see the “exercise of sovereign governmental au-
thority,” affecting governmental interests in criminal proceed-
ings, and “significantly affecting the life, liberty, or property of 
private persons”—all key attributes of the criminal prosecution 
function—enumerated as touchstones of inherently governmen-
tal functions. In addition, the “exercise of substantial discretion” 
is cited as a hallmark of an inherently governmental function. 
However, Circular No. A-76 cautions that “[w]hile inherently 
governmental activities require the exercise of substantial dis-
cretion, not every exercise of discretion is evidence that an activi-
ty is inherently governmental.”115 The exercise of discretion 
“shall be deemed inherently governmental if it commits the gov-
ernment to a course of action when two or more alternative 
courses of action exist and decision-making is not already limited 
or guided by existing policies, procedures, directions, orders, and 
other guidance that (1) identify specified ranges of acceptable 
decisions or conduct and (2) subject the discretionary authority to 
final approval or regular oversight by agency officials.”116 Even 
with this caveat, the tremendous, unchecked discretion tradi-
tionally enjoyed by prosecutors almost certainly would qualify 
criminal prosecution as an inherently governmental function. 
Criminal prosecution, it cannot be seriously disputed, quali-
fies as an inherently governmental function within the meaning 
of the statutory and regulatory law governing federal out-
sourcing to the private sector. As such, one reasonably can con-
clude that discretionary prosecutorial activities would not be eli-
gible for outsourcing by the federal government should the 
Department of Justice seek to contract out criminal prosecution 
to the private sector as is posed in the thought experiment 
above.117 Although this statutory scheme is not necessarily appli-
cable to most existing prosecutorial outsourcing,118 it does illu-
minate important policy norms relevant to the delegation of 
  
Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-76 (revised) *2 (Aug 4, 1983). 
 115 Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-76 (revised) A-2 (May 29, 2003). 
 116 Id. 
 117 See Part II.B. above. 
 118 Although most prosecution outsourcing currently takes place on the state level, 
state outsourcing law, as outsourcing and privatization scholar Ellen Dannin observes, is 
notoriously underdeveloped relative to federal law. See Dannin, 60 Md L Rev at 251 (cited 
in note 3) (noting only “a handful of states that had [enacted comprehensive legislation on 
privatization and subcontracting] . . . and a patchwork of miscellaneous legislation in 
states that had not”); Dannin, 15 Cornell J L & Pub Pol at 142 (cited in note 50) (noting 
that “most states lack any regularized oversight of contracting”). For an examination of 
state approaches to privatization, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and Democracy, 
in Freeman and Minow, eds, Government by Contract 261–88 (cited in note 6). 
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prosecutorial authority to private actors, including a strong skep-
ticism of the delegation of discretionary functions. Even if such 
norms are given short shrift in other areas of government  
outsourcing,119 perhaps they should be observed in the area of 
criminal prosecution. 
F. Sovereignty and the Public Prosecution Norm 
That prosecutorial discretion is broad and potent is widely 
acknowledged. Prosecutors have largely unfettered discretion as 
to whether and what to charge, and such decisions have profound 
consequences for defendants, victims, and the community.120 
Particularly given the plea bargain–driven modern system of 
criminal justice,121 prosecutors are the single most influential 
organ of criminal justice administration. 
However, the prosecutor’s discretionary power has profound 
meaning apart from its administrative role and impact. By de-
clining to prosecute a winnable case, either in an individual case 
or across the board under a particular criminal statute, prosecu-
tors decide whether a law will be enforced.122 In one context, the 
prosecutor’s decision to decline prosecution in a specific case in 
the interest of justice places in the prosecutor’s hands the sover-
eign prerogative of forbearance against a particular defendant.123 
In another context, a prosecutor who decides that a certain law 
will not be enforced because it does not comport with her policy 
  
 119 See generally Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty (cited in note 6); Schooner and 
Greenspahn, J Cont Mgmt 209 (Summer 2008) (cited in note 6). 
 120 See, for example, Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional 
Design, 93 Cornell L Rev 703, 732–33 (2008); Young v Vuitton et Fils SA, 481 US 787, 814 
(1987) (“Between the private life of the citizen and the public glare of criminal accusation 
stands the prosecutor. That state official has the power to employ the full machinery of 
the state in scrutinizing any given individual. Even if a defendant is ultimately acquitted, 
forced immersion in criminal investigation and adjudication is a wrenching disruption of 
everyday life. For this reason, we must have assurance that those who would wield this 
power will be guided solely by their sense of public responsibility for the attainment of 
justice.”). 
 121 See, for example, Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 
Ga L Rev 407, 409 (2008); Ronald Wright and Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining 
Tradeoff, 55 Stan L Rev 29, 30 n 1 (2002) (“In the federal system, the proportion of convic-
tions obtained through pleas of guilty or nolo contendere has reached 95% and has been 
climbing steadily for over 30 years.”). 
 122 See Fairfax, Prosecutorial Nullification? (cited in note 66). 
 123 See Austin Sarat and Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of 
Sovereignty, and the Limits of Law, 33 Law & Soc Inquiry 387, 390 (2008) (“Yet the deci-
sions prosecutors make involve, in our view, something more than a straightforward 
exercise of discretion. Where others see discretion, we see a fragment of sovereignty.”). 
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preferences can singlehandedly determine whether a law, though 
passed by the legislature, will be a dead letter.124 
Whether or not there are good reasons for prosecutors to 
have this tremendous authority to exercise the sovereign prerog-
ative, ceding this authority to private actors is problematic to say 
the least. The system of private prosecution dominant in the 
United States in the nineteenth century eventually gave way to 
the public prosecution norm we enjoy today.125 Although there 
are a number of reasons the public prosecutor achieved promi-
nence in modern criminal justice,126 one significant reason is that 
public prosecution bolsters public confidence in the fairness and 
impartiality of criminal justice. 
As the Supreme Court has reminded us, the government’s 
interest in a criminal case “is not that it shall win a case, but 
that justice shall be done.”127 Even if, for instance, the Henry & 
Bell lawyers prosecuting criminal cases were vigilant to ensure 
their fidelity to this ideal, there is very little assurance that they 
are operating as honest brokers. Private lawyers working crimi-
nal cases under an outsourcing contract are not as likely to share 
the professional identity of public prosecutors, which incorpo-
rates the values discussed above.128 When sworn government 
employees rather than private lawyers litigate a criminal case, 
  
 124 See Fairfax, Prosecutorial Nullification? (cited in note 66). See generally Richard 
E. Myers II, Responding to the Time-Based Failure of Criminal Law through a Criminal 
Sunset Amendment, 49 BC L Rev 1327 (2008). 
 125 For more on the history of private prosecution, see Davis, Arbitrary Justice 9 (cited 
in note 63); Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of “Public” Prosecutors in 
Historical Perspective, 39 Am Crim L Rev 1309, 1326 (2002); Meier, 70 Wash U L Q at 
103–07 (cited in note 78); Ireland, 39 Am J Legal Hist at 49 (cited in note 79). 
  The system of private prosecution—where victims had the responsibility and au-
thority to hire private counsel to prosecute criminal cases against the wrongdoer—is not 
analogous to prosecution outsourcing, in which the state retains responsibility for crimi-
nal prosecution but contracts the work out to private lawyers. Nevertheless, both private 
prosecution and prosecution outsourcing certainly are in tension with the public prosecu-
tion norm. See Fairfax, 43 UC Davis L Rev at 426 (cited in note 53). 
 126 Id at 432–33 & n 78. 
 127 Berger v US, 295 US 78, 88 (1935). 
 128 See Fairfax, 43 UC Davis L Rev at 435 (“[T]he public nature of the prosecutorial 
role has been absorbed by and is intertwined with the professional identity of prosecu-
tors.”). The American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Section bestows the “Norm 
Maleng Minister of Justice Award” annually to a prosecutor who represents the ideals 
associated with the public prosecution norm. The criteria for the award require that it be 
given to “a prosecutor who exemplifies the principles that: (1) the prosecutor’s obligation 
is to protect the innocent as well as to convict the guilty; (2) the prosecutor must guard 
the rights of the accused as well as enforce the rights of the public; and (3) the prosecu-
tor’s commitment to the legal and ethical standards must be unwavering.” See ABA 
Criminal Justice Section, Norm Maleng Minister of Justice Award, online at 
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/ministerofjusticeaward.doc (visited Sept 11, 2010). 
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we may have greater confidence that the Supreme Court’s ad-
monition to “do justice” is heeded and that the government’s sol-
emn obligation is met. 
CONCLUSION 
It is difficult enough to manage and constrain the dis-
cretionary authority of public prosecutors. The most promising 
mechanisms for doing so are democratic accountability and pros-
ecutorial professionalization, both of which are either diminished 
or lacking in the prosecution outsourcing context. Prosecutors do 
much more than bring to court criminal matters; they are 
charged with the solemn duty to “do justice”—a task involving 
judgment and the wise exercise of discretion, and one not  
easily instrumentalized for purposes of an outsourcing con-
tractual arrangement. 
As the author has argued elsewhere, there are ways we 
might attempt to mitigate the various concerns with the private 
exercise of criminal prosecution authority.129 Among these are 
limiting private actors to “ministerial” functions, guiding the dis-
cretion private actors exercise, and implementing mechanisms to 
enhance the transparency of prosecutorial decisions made by pri-
vate contractors.130 Furthermore, incentives might be embedded 
in these outsourcing agreements to encourage private actors to 
act in the public interest. However, even with these remedial 
efforts, there remains the fundamental concern that it is inap-
propriate to outsource to private actors a function so closely iden-
tified with the sovereign prerogative of the state. 
Nevertheless, other forms of criminal justice outsourcing, 
such as private prisons and some species of private policing, have 
developed and even expanded despite similar concerns. Given the 
fiscal crisis facing jurisdictions around the nation, the perceived 
cost savings associated with prosecution outsourcing may over-
shadow the serious drawbacks of eroding the public prosecution 
norm. Thus, regardless of the fundamental challenge it poses to 
our understanding of the public/private distinction, query 
whether prosecution outsourcing is the inevitable next step  in 
the troubling march toward greater privatization of  criminal 
justice. 
  
 129 Fairfax, 43 UC Davis L Rev at 435. 
 130 See id at 448–55. 
